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One goal of welfare economics is to provide a method forevaluating policy changes.
A basic question in welfare economics is therefore what should determinewhether
or not a policy change is deemed desirable? While research on this question has
not been active of late, the issue remains far from resolved. Thispaper takes
a fresh look at the problem, exploring an alternative way the theory of policy
evaluation might proceed.
There are two main approaches to policy evaluation in the literature,one using
social welfare functions and the other compensation criteria. The socialwelfare
function approach evaluates a policy change by comparing the utility allocations
that arise before and after the change. A social welfare function ispostulated
which ranks alternative utility allocations and the policy change is deemed desir-
able if the new utility allocation generates a higher level of social welfare than the
status quo.
The compensation criteria approach avoids direct comparision of the status
quo and post-policy change utility allocations. The most popular criterion, due
to Kaldor (1939), evaluates a policy change by comparing the statusquo utility
allocation with the set of utility allocations that can be reached throughlump
sum redistribution from the post-change situation. A policy change is deemed
desirable if there exists a utility allocation in the latter set which Pareto dominates
the status quo. This implies that it is possible to redistribute (with costlesslump
sum transfers) from the beneficiaries of the change to the losers in such away as
to leave all parties better off.
Both these approaches suffer from well-known difficulties.' Since Robbins
(1938), many economists have found the social welfare function approach unac-
ceptable because it involves making interpersonal comparisons of utility for which
there is, as yet, no scientific basis. The approach also leavesopen the question
of what the right social welfare function is. While compensation criteria have
the advantage that they do not require interpersonal comparisons of utility, their
ethical justification is unclear. In the case of the Kaldor criterion, why should the
fact that the gainers could compensate the losers make socially desirable the in-
fliction of those losses? Moreover, compensation criteria can produce inconsistent
policy recommendations in the sense that they can simultaneously recommend
introducing and removing the same policy change.
'For a good general review see Boadway and Bruce (1984).
2Such difficulties have led many to conclude that the welfare economicanalysis
of policy changes is a dead end.2 However, as stressed by Little(1958), an alterna-
tive way of evaluating a policy change is tocompare it with other possible policy
changes and such comparisons can be made in an uncontroversialway. Specifi-
cally, the analyst can always ask whether a policy change is efficient in the sense
that there exists no other feasible policy change which producesa Pareto superior
utility allocation. If a policy change is efficient in this sense, the policy change
is a sensible way of implementing the distributional changes it induces. Thecase
for the policy change is then a question of whether these particular distributional
changes are desirable -aquestion which requires a distributional judgement to
resolve. However, if it is not efficient, then it seems reasonable to declare the
policy change socially undesirable, for if the distributional changes it induces are
desirable, it is better (using only the ethical judgement underlying the Pareto
criterion) to achieve these changes through some other means.
The above logic suggests an efficiency approach to the theory of policy evalu-
ation. When confronted with a particular policy change, the policy analyst would
not investigate whether the social value of the utility gains exceed the social value
of the losses or whether the gainers might in principle compensate the losers.
Rather, he/she would investigate alternative policy changes that could be made
with similar distributional consequences. A policy change would be judged ef-
ficient if there did not exist an alternative policy change which was better for
all. Inefficient policy changes would not be recommended, on the grounds that
there exist alternative policy changes which generate Pareto superior outcomes.
Efficient policy changes would be deemed sensible ways of achieving the distribu-
tional changes that they produce. The policy analyst would take no position on
the desirability of these changes.
This paper argues that such an efficiency approach represents a coherentap-
proach to the theory of policy evaluation which fits naturally with current thinking
in normative public economics. The paper begins with a formal statement of the
efficiency approach, a comparison with the social welfare function and compensa-
tion criteria approaches, and a discussion of how it relates to modern normative
public economics and ideas from cost benefit analysis. The paper then illustrates
2The following quote by Baumol (1946-7) is typical: "As soon as a redistribution of income
is involved in some innovation, the economist is prevented from passing judgement on the desir-
ability of that innovation since he is unable to tell whether the change in distribution is good,
bad or indifferent, or whether the importance of this latter effect is of sufficient magnitude
to vitiate any other considerations which may have led to recommendation or rejection of the
proposal." (p. 46)
3the approach by applying it to three separate examples relating toregulation, the
provision of public goods and public production. The examples serve to show
how the efficiency logic works and the types of implications it has. Thepaper also
anticipates and discusses some objections to the efficiency approach.
2. The Efficiency Approach
2.1.AStatement
The typical situation envisaged by welfare economics is one in which a"policy-
maker" proposes a policy change and a "policy analyst" is given the job of eval-
uating it. The theory of policy evaluation tries to provide a consistent procedure
by which the analyst may determine whether or not the policy change is "socially
desirable". To provide a formal framework in which to discuss the problem, con-
sider an economy consisting of n citizens, indexed by i E .iV ={ 1,...,n}.Letp
denote a vector of government policies and let V(p) denote citizen i's (indirect)
utility when the policy vector is p. Let Po denote the status quo policy vector and
let p' denote the proposed policy change.
The efficiency approach evaluates Lp' by comparing it with other feasible
policy changes. Letting LiP denote the set of all feasible policy changes, the policy
change Lip' is efficient if there does not exist p LP such that V1(p0 + p) ￿
V(p0+Lp') for every citizen i e .Af with the inequality holding strictly for at
least one citizen i. If Lp' is efficient, the approach declares it a sensibleway
to achieve the distributional changes it produces. The case for it then depends
on a distributional judgement. If Lp' is not efficient, the approach declares it
undesirable on the grounds that there exists an alternative feasible policy change
which is better for everyone.
2.2. Comparison with the Social Welfare Function Approach
As noted in the introduction, the social welfare function approach evaluates
the policy change zp' by comparing the post-change utility allocation {V1(p0 +
zp')},.j with the status quo utility allocation {V(p0)}-. A social welfare func-
tion W(V1, ...,V)is postulated and the change is recommended if and only if it
enhances the value of the social welfare function: i.e., W({V(p0 + zp')}.r) >
W({V(pO)}E).3
31n some of the modern literature on cost benefit analysis, the social welfare function is
assumed to be chosen by the policy-maker (see, for example, Dreze and Stern (1987)). Then,
4Two points concerning the differences between the two approachesare worth
noting here.4 First, the efficiency approach adopts a different notion of social
desirability than the social welfare function approach. Under the latter, a policy
change being undesirable means that undertaking it will not enhance some notion
of societal well-being. Under the former, a policy change being undesirablesimply
means that there exists another policy change that would be better for all. Both
notions of undesirability seem legitimate, but it is important in interpreting the
efficiency approach to keep the distinction clear.
Second, it is not necessary to view the efficiency approach as an alternative
to the social welfare function approach. By comparing the proposed change with
other policy changes, it is simply focusing on a different question. Theanswer
to this question is of interest even when one is using the social welfare function
approach. When a policy change is inefficient then there will exist an alternative
policy change which will lead to a bigger increase in societal well-being than the
proposed change.
2.3.Comparisonwith the Compensation Criteria Approach
There are two compensation criteria relevant for our analysis; the Kaldor criterion,
described in the introduction, and the Hicks criterion (Hicks (1940)). The latter
evaluates a policy change by comparing the post-change utility allocation with
the set of utility allocations that can be reached through lump sum redistribution
from the status quo. A policy change is deemed desirable if there does not exist a
utility allocation in the latter set which weakly Pareto dominates the post-change
situation. This implies that it is not possible to redistribute (with costless lump
sum transfers) from the potential losers to the beneficiaries in such a way as to
leave all parties better off than they would be under the policy change. The
Hicks criterion is similar in spirit to the Kaldor criterion, but goes in the reverse
direction.
A common criticism of these criteria is that in reality government is unlikely
to be able to employ lump sum transfers. Informational problems, constitutional
restrictions on policy instruments and administrative costs, mean that real world
redistributive policies may be significantly cruder and involve substantial dead-
weight costs (Samuelson (1950), Graaff (1957)). Later interpretations of the corn-
the job of the analyst is simply to inform the policy-maker as to whether the policy change will
enhance his objectives and distributional judgements play no role. Under this view, the idea
that there is some absolute notion of social desirability is explicitly rejected.
4Some further differences are discussed in section 4.
5pensation criteria have therefore often insisted that the compensations be made
using the available redistributive instruments (see, for example, Dixit and Norman
(1986) and Dreze and Stern (1987)).
Under this interpretation, the Kaldor and Hicks criteria may readily be il-
lustrated in our framework. Suppose that the government's policy instruments
can be divided into two categories; tax-transfer instruments and levels of public
goods, public inputs, etc. Formally, suppose that p =(t,g) where t is a vector
of tax-transfer levels and g is a vector of public production decisions. The policy
change will typically involve changes in both tax-transfer levels and public pro-
duction levels. Let z.t' and zg' denote these changes, so that Lp' =(st', Lg').
Thepolicy change p' satisfies the Kaldor criterion if there exists /.t such that
(zt, Lg') E andV(p0+(zt,zg'))V(p0) for every citizen i eJv' withthe
inequality holding strictly for at least one citizen i. It satisfies the Hicks criterion if
there does not exist Ltsuchthat (st, 0) E LP and V(p0 + (st, 0)) ￿ V2(p0+ p')
forevery citizen i E V with the inequality holding strictly for at least one citizen
i.
Checkingwhether a policy change satisfies these criteria is formally similar
to checking whether a policy change is efficient. The similarity of the Hicks
criterion is most transparent since it compares the proposed policy change with
other feasible policy changes. Indeed, any policy change which does not satisfy
the Hicks criterion must also be inefficient. (The converse is not true because
the Hicks criterion restricts comparisons to a subset of policy changes; namely,
variations in the tax-transfer system.) The Kaldor criterion differs in focusing
on a comparison of other similar changes (in the sense that z.g =g')with
the option of doing nothing, rather than with the proposed change. This means
that satisfying the Kaldor criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for a policy
change to be efficient. However, if a policy change satisfies the Kaldor criterion,
the policy change defined by reversing it once it is in place is inefficient. Thus,
eliminating the change is an inefficient way to help those who the change hurts.
(Of course, it is not clear why this should be relevant for the question of whether
the change should be undertaken!)
Their formal similarity not withstanding, the justifications for using the Kaldor
and Hicks criteria are very different from that underlying the efficiency approach.
This is evidenced by the fact that satisfying these criteria is taken as evidence
of the social desirability of a policy change. Thus, in the case of the Kaldor
criterion, the fact that the losers could be compensated by a change in the tax-
transfer system is taken to imply that the "social value" of the beneficiaries' gains
6must exceed the "social cost" of the losers' losses. While one is certainly free to
make this particular distributional judgement, there seems nocompelling reason
to do so.5
While many authors criticized the standard interpretation of the Kaldor and
Hicks criteria, Little (1958) also recognized that the Hicks criterion could bejus-
tified with the efficiency logic. He proposed that a policy change was "desirable if
(a) it would result in a good redistribution of wealth, and if (b) the potential losers
could not profitably bribe the potential gainers to oppose the change" (p. 275).
The second part of this test is the Hicks criterion (in lump sum transfer form)
and was justified by the argument that if it were not satisfied, then the policy
change could be dominated by lump sum redistribution and therefore should be
rejected. The first part recognized that efficiency in this sense was not a sufficient
condition for desirability and that a distributional judgement wasnecessary to go
further.
In modern terms, Little's proposal can be thought of as first checking to see
whether p' raised social welfare and then, if it was efficient. However, under
this interpretation, his proposal is problematic (see, for example, Chipman and
Moore (1978)). A policy change enhancing social welfare and being efficient does
not imply that there does not exist an alternative policy change yielding a higher
level of social welfare. Thus, given that we must compare Lp' with other policy
changes to establish its efficiency, we might as well also ask if there exists another
policy change which leads to a higher level of social welfare. In other words, if
one believes that redistributions can be ranked in some meaningful way, then why
not ask whether there exists some other change which delivers an even better
redistribution?
To sum up, checking whether a policy change satisfies the compensation crite-
ria of Kaldor and Hicks is similar to checking whether it is efficient. Specifically,
5As noted in the introduction, this judgement also gives rise to inconsistent policy recom-
mendations. As first shown by Scitovsky (1941), it is perfectly possible for both introducing and
removing a policy change to satisfy the Kaldor criteria. Similarly, it is possible for the Hicks
criteria to reject both introducing and removing a policy change. This "paradox" arises when a
policy change satisfies the Kaldor criterion, but fails the Hicks criterion. Intuitively, the policy
change is an inefficient way of helping those whom it benefits, but removing it is an inefficient
way of helping those who it huits. In this context, it is worth noting that it is also possible for
a policy change to be efficient but for removing that policy change to be efficient. This would
be the case, for example, if both Po + p' and Po were "Pareto efficient policies" (see below for
a definition). However, this is in no sense a paradox because the two policy changes have very
different distributional consequences.
7not satisfying the Hicks criterion is sufficient for a policy change to beinefficient,
while passing the Kaldor criterion is sufficient for the policychange created by
reversing the proposed change to be inefficient. However, the standard justifica-
tion for the two criteria is not in terms of the efficiency logic,as evidenced by the
fact that both tests are viewed as sufficient statistics fora policy change to be
socially desirable. An exception to this is the work of Little who uses the efficiency
logic to justify a criterion which combines the Hicks criterion with a distributional
j udgement.
2.4. Relation to Modern Normative Public Economics
Following Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), the normative public economics liter-
ature has devoted considerable attention to the characterization of second best
optimal public policies. This style of analysis presupposes the existence of a social
welfare function )'V(V1,...,V)and seeks to characterize the vector of policies p*
that maximize W({V(p)}jE) subject to the constraint thatp E P. where P is
the feasible set of policies. More recently, however, reflectingmany economists'
aversion to social welfare functions, the trend in the literature has been towards
the characterization of Pareto efficient policies.6 A policy p* ePis Pareto effi-
cient if there does not exist an alternative policy p E P which produces a Pareto
dominant utility allocation.
Under the assumption that the set of feasible policy changes is related to the
set of feasible policies in the obvious way; i.e.. P ={p: p0+Lip ?}. it is clear
that the policy change p' is efficient if and only jf P + z.p" is a Pareto efficient
policy. This linkage implies that characterizations of efficient policy choices have
direct relevance for the evaluation of policy changes under the efficiency approach.
Checking whether a policy change Lp' is efficient amounts to checking whether
p0 + zp' produces a utility allocation on the second best utility possibility frontier.
Accordingly, the rich set of results characterizing efficient policy choices in specific
environments have direct application to the evaluation of policy changes under the
efficiency approach.7 It is in this sense that the efficiency approach fits in naturally
with current practice in normative public economics.8
6Early papers in this vein are Harris (1979) and Stiglitz (1982).
7The environment which is best understood is that introduced by Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971). This assumes that, in addition to public goods, the government can choose consumer
and producer prices. Guesnerie (1995) provides a state of the art survey of what is known about
efficient policies in this model.
8A further literature worth mentioning is that on "policy reform" (see Guesnerie (1995) for a
82.5. Relationto the Theory of Cost Benefit Analysis
The cost-benefit approach to policy evaluation is to compute each citizen's com-
pensating variation associated with a policy change and recommend it if and only
if the sum of these is positive. The intellectual foundation for the approach is
often claimed to be the Kaldor criterion, the belief being that the sum of citizens'
compensating variations being positive is a necessary and sufficient condition for
this criterion to be satisfied.9 In applications, the cost benefit approach is some-
times criticized for giving equal weight to the gains and losses of the rich as to
those of the poor. In response to this problem, it is sometimes argued that the
gains and losses of the poor should be given additional weight in the cost-benefit
calculus. This practice was criticized by Harberger (1978) on the grounds that
it might sometimes lead to the recommendation of projects benefitting the poor
which were less efficient than other feasible redistributive programs.
Following the lead of Harberger (1978), Gramlich (1990) suggests classifying
policy changes which benefit the poor into three groups. First, those that "pass
the test for economic efficiency" (i.e., the sum of compensating variations test);
second, those that "fail the test for economic efficiency, but are more efficient than
any other programs in raising low incomes"; and third, those that "fail the test
for economic efficiency, and are less efficient than some other program in raising
low incomes" (p.116). Gramlich then argues that there is a clear case for doing
projects in the first category and a clear case for not doing projects in the third
category. There may also be a case for projects in the second category if helping
the poor is a concern.
comprehensive review). Given a particular status quo policy vector Pa, this literature addresses
the problem of finding a feasible policy change .p E LSP with the property that p + p
produces a utility allocation which Pareto dominates the status quo. This is related to, but
quite different from, the problem of checking whether a given policy change .p' is efficient. The
latter requires addressing the problem of finding a feasible policy change z.p E P with the
property that Po + ip produces a utility allocation which Pareto dominates that generated by
PaLp'. In fact, the efficiency problem in this context has been studied by Weymark (1981).
In the Diamond-Mirrlees model, he seeks to identify "small" policy changes which (i) Pareto
dominate the status quo and (ii) are not Pareto dominated by any other small policy changes.
In developing the implications of the second condition, he effectively characterizes the set of
efficient policy changes, when changes are constrained to be "small". His work therefore forms
a foundation for analyzing policy changes with the efficiency approach in the Diamond-Mirrlees
model when only small policy changes are feasible.
91n fact, because prices will typically change when redistribution takes place, this equivalence
holds only under extreme assumptions (see Boadway (1974) and Blackorby and Donaldson
(1990)).
9In the language of this paper, what is proposed here is theuse of the efficiency
approach for policy changes which benefit the poor but do notpass the sum of
compensating variations test. The proposal differs from what is suggested in this
paper in first using the efficiency approach only when a policy change benefits
the poor and second even then only as a supplement to thesum of compensating
variations test. Both of these positions are problematic. First,restricting the
use of the efficiency approach to changes which benefit thepoor is completely
arbitrary. As will be demonstrated in oar second example below, policychanges
benefiting the rich can perfectly well pass the sum of compensating variations
test, but be inefficient. Would not the same logic suggest that there is a clear
case for not undertaking such changes? Second, the continued relianceon the
sum of compensating variations test means that a policy change which benefits
the poor is deemed unambiguously socially desirable if thepoor's benefits exceeds
the rich's costs, while an outsider's value judgement is deemednecessary if the
poor's benefits fall short of the rich's costs.
3. The Efficiency Approach at Work
This section applies the efficiency approach to three stylized examplesinvolving
the imposition of a price control, the provision of a public good, and the choice of
public employment. These applications should permit the reader to understand
the operation of the efficiency approach in more concrete settings, andsee the
types of implications it has.
3.1. The Imposition of a Price Control
There are n citizens, indexed by i E {1,...,n},and two goods, x and z. Good
x is the numeraire and good z has price p. Each citizen i has an endowment of
the numeraire or "income" y2. Good z is produced from x by m firms, indexed
by jE{1, ...,m}.For each firm j,thecost of producing good z (in terms of the
numeraire) is described by the cost function c(z), where c is smooth, increasing
and strictly convex. The m firms are owned by the citizens, with citizen i owning a
sharee [0, 1] of firm j.Eachcitizen i has preferences over his own consumption
of x and z given by the utility function u2(x, z) =x+ (z), whereis smooth,
increasing and strictly concave.
If the market for z were unregulated, each firm jwouldchoose to supply an
10amount s(p) of good z at price p. where
.s(p)= argmaxp.s —c(s).
Let S(p) =m•s(p) denote aggregate supply at price p and let 7r(p) denote each
firm's profits. Each citizen would choose to demand an amount d(p) of goodz at
price p, where1°
d(p) =argmax(d)—p. d.
Letting D(p) =n•d(p) denote aggregate demand at price p, the equilibrium price
would be p where D(p*) =S(p*)and citizen i would enjoy a utility level
=(d(p))—pt d(pt) + y
If the government were to regulate the market by imposing a price ceiling
<the aggregate supply of the good would be S(p). Assuming that this
supply were divided equally among the n citizens, each citizen would consume an
amount S(p)/n. Citizen i would then obtain a utility level
(p) =(S(p)/n)-p•S(p)/n + y +
Notice, for future reference, that V(pt) =
Considerthen the efficiency of a policy change under which the government
imposes a price ceiling p <p on the unregulated market. Suppose first that the
oniy policy instrument that the government has available is a price control. Let
denote the price control which maximizes consumers' surplus; i.e.,11
maxç(S(p)/n) —pS(p)/n.
The first order condition for this problem implies that
=1+1/E();
where E(p) is the elasticity of supply at price p. The left hand side of this equality is
decreasing in ,equalling1 when =pt.Thus, roughly speaking, the divergence
of from the laissez-faire price is inversely related to the elasticity of supply.
am assumingthateach citizen's income is sufficient to cover the expenditure pd(p) over
the relevant range of prices.
"If this is not unique, take the largest such value.
11Assuming that there is at least one citizen h who owns no shares inany of
the firms, imposing the price ceilingp is an efficient policy change if and only if
p E [ p*] Any price ceiling less thanis inefficient, since the price ceiling
both generates more consumer surplus and higher firm profits. Tosee that price
ceilings in excess of are efficient, note that higher price ceilings lower consumer
surplus and hence hurt those citizens who do not own shares. However, lower price
ceilings reduce firm profits by more than they raise consumer surplus, implying
that these citizens with higher than average share holdings must beworse off.
Imposing a price control in the range [,p*I redistributes from those citizens
who own the firms to those who do not. If the government has available other
policy instruments which allow it to redistribute in this way, then introducing
price controls might be inefficient. For example, suppose that the government
can impose a tax on the firms' profits at rate r and redistribute the proceeds via
a uniform lump-sum transfer T. Then, imposing a price control is an inefficient
policy change.
To see this, consider some price control p E [,*] and let denote the increase
in (per capita) consumer surplus it generates; that is,
e= [y(S(p)/n)-p.S(p)/n] -{y(S(p*)/n)-S(p)/nJ.
Let r be the tax rate which generates revenue equal to the aggregate consumer
surplus increase generated by the price control; that is, r*mlr(p*) =n.Then, the
policy change under which profits are taxed at rate T*andeach citizen receives a
cash transfer .Paretodominates the policy change associated with introducing
the price control p.
This example illustrates two points. First, the efficiency approach has some
implications (in the sense of being able to reject some policy changes) even when
government has access to a very limited array of policy choices. This is illustrated
by the fact that not all price controls are efficient, even when all the government
can do is to impose price controls. Second, whether or not a policy change is
efficient depends critically on what instruments are available. Economists are
fond of saying that imposing price controls is "inefficient", but, under the efficiency
approach, such a statement cannot be made without some knowledge of what else
might be done. It might very well be, for example, that imposing a price control
in a less developed country with a very primitive fiscal infrastructure could be
efficient. while the same policy would be inefficient in a developed economy.'2
'2There are a number of papers investigating when price controls form part of an optimal
123.2. TheProvision of a Public Good
There are n citizens and two goods, a private good x and a discrete publicgood
g E{O,1 }.Citizensare endowed with the private good and the public good can be
produced with C units of the private good. Citizens are divided into two groups:
flp"poor"citizens with endowments of good x or "income"yp and R "rich"
citizens with income YR> yp.Citizens in group K (K E{P,R}) have identical
preferences over the public good and their own consumption of the private good
given by x + VK g. It is assumed that '0K <Cfor both groups K so that no
citizen has an incentive to unilaterally purchase the public good.
The government is responsible for the public good decision and, in addition,
the operation of a tax-transfer system. The tax-transfer system is characterized
by two parameters; a tax rate t e[0,1] and a uniform transfer T. Imposing the
tax rate t generates revenue t(1 —6)n,where 5 e[0,1] is a parameter measuring
the slippage in the tax-transfer system andis mean income. The slippage
parameter is such that 5 <[ — ypJ/,which implies that raising the tax rate and
redistributing the proceeds via the uniform transfer raises a poor citizen's utility.
The government's budget constraint is given by t(1 —6)n =nT+Cg,implying
that if the government selects a tax rate t and a public good decisiong E {0, 1},
the transfer must be
T(t, g) =t(1
— — gC/n.
Thus, we can think of the government as simply selecting a pair (t, g), with the
transfer then being given by T(t, g). 'When the pair (t, g) is selected, citizens in
group K enjoy a utility level
VK(t, g) =T(t,9) + (1 —t)yK+ VK .9.
Suppose that the status quo is (t0, 0), so that the public good is not provided,
and consider a policy change which involves the provision of the public good
(zig'1) financed by tax changes t' ￿ 0. This change is clearly inefficient
if VK <C/nfor both groups K {P, R}, for it can be Pareto dominated by
the change (st', 0) which simply redistributes the costs of the public good via
the transfer. Conversely, the change is efficient if VK >C/nfor both groups
K e{P,R}.
policy package. Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) establish the general desirability of quantity
controls in an abstract second best model. Allen (1987), Boadway and Cuff (1999) and Guesnerie
and Roberts (1987) discuss the desirability of minimum wages under various assumptions about
the available alternatives.
13The interesting cases arise when tR < C/n <t'porVp < C/n < R• In the
former case, the policy change serves to redistribute from the richto the poor. In
the latter case, the redistributionmay be towards the rich or the poor, depending
on the way in which the good is financed. If t' > 0, the rich bear agreater share
of the cost of the public good and hencemay be worse off after the policy change
even when C/ri < v. Either way, the question is whether the redistribution the
policy change generates would be more efficiently carried out via changing the
tax-transfer system rather than through the provision of the publicgood.
To give the poor the same level of utility as they receive after thepolicy
change without providing the public good would require a tax change of
where Vp(t0 + At*, 0) =Vp(t0+ Lit',1).Assuming that such a tax change exists'3
and solving this equation for t* reveals that
zt*= t' + [vp — C/nJ/[(l — 6) — yp].
The policy change is efficient if and only if VR(t0 +0) < VR(t0 + zt', 1) which
requires that
t' ￿ t' + [yR —C/n]/[(l
— — YR1.
Combining these equations reveals that the policy change is efficient if and only
if
7— C/n ￿ 6.y. [yR —vp}/[yR
—yp], (3.1)
where 5 =[nRVR+ npvp]/n denotes the average valuation of the public good.'4
Notice that this condition is independent of zt' and hence theway the public
good is financed. The specification of utilities and the linearity of the deadweight
loss of taxation imply that the utility possibility frontiers with and without the
public good are linear and parallel to each other. If the above condition is satisfied,
the utility possibility frontier with the public good lies to the right of the frontier
without the public good. Accordingly, it is not possible to Pareto dominateany
utility allocation in which the public good is provided with one in which it is
not. If the condition is not satisfied, the utility possibility frontier with the public
good lies to the left of the frontier without the public good. Thus, it is possible
to Pareto dominate any utility allocation in which the public good is provided,
provided only that there exists a point on the utility frontier without the public
'3Necessary and sufficient conditions for there to exist such a tax change are that t0i.t"
exceeds [C/n —vp}/[(1
— — yp]and that 1 —(t0 + t1) exceeds[Vp— C/nJ/[(1— — yp}.
141n deriving this condition it is helpful to note that {vR —VP]+ VPYR —vnyp= — YP)•
14good which gives the poor the same level of utility.'5 In a more general model in
which the deadweight loss of taxation emerged endogenously from, forexample.
variable labor supply, the utility possibility frontiers with and without thepublic
good could cross and hence the efficiency of a policy change involving provision
of the public good might depend on how it was financed.
Observe that when the poor have a higher valuation of the publicgood (Vp >
VR), the right hand side of (3.1) is negative. Thus, a sufficient condition for the
policy to be efficient is that the average valuation of the public good exceed its
per capita cost. Intuitively, this reflects the fact that the public good benefits
the poor and redistributing to the poor via the tax-transfersystem will entail
slippage. When the rich have the higher valuation of the public good, the right
hand side of the inequality is positive implying that anecessary condition for the
policy to be efficient is that the average valuation of the public good exceeds its
per capita cost. This reflects the fact that redistributing to the rich via reducing
the tax rate avoids deadweight loss.16
This example is particularly useful for illustrating the differences between the
efficiency and cost-benefit approaches. The sum of compensating variations test
implies recommending the policy change if and only if
iY—C/n>6•Lt'. (3.2)
The left hand side represents the average surplus from the public good, while the
right hand side represents the deadweight loss from a higher tax rate.
Notice that when the poor have the higher valuation of the public good, if (3.2)
is satisfied then so is (3.1). Thus, if the policy change satisfies the cost-benefit test
it is efficient. The converse is not true, implying that the cost-benefit test rejects
efficient policy changes. This illustrates the concern in the cost-benefit literature
that the standard test may give misleading guidance when projects benefit the
poor.
may exist utility allocations in which the public good is provided with the property
that there exists no point on the utility frontier without the jublic good which gives thepoor
the same level of utility. For example, if C/n < vp the utility allocation (Vp(1, 1), VR(1, 1)) has
this property. Such cases are ruled out by the assumption that there exists a t'suchthat
Vp(to + t*,O) =Vp(t0+ .t', 1).
'6The logic here is similar to that in Boadway and Keen (1993) who characterize Pareto
efficient policy choices in a world in which there are two types of citizens and policies include a
continuous public good and non-linear income taxes. Whether the public good is over-provided
relative to the Samuelson condition depends on the relative marginal evaluations of the two
types.
15More interestingly, when the rich have the higher valuation of the publicgood,
passing the cost-benefit test is neither necessary nor sufficient for a policy change
to be efficient. That the standard test is not sufficient can be seen most easily by
considering the case where t' 0, so the public good is financed uniformly. In
this case, the policy change benefits the rich. From (3.2), we see that the policy
change passes the standard test if the average valuation of the public good exceeds
its per-capita cost. However, this condition obviously does not imply that (3.1) is
satisfied. This illustrates the point made in section 2.5: policy changes benefiting
the rich can perfectly well pass the cost-benefit test, but be inefficient.
3.3.TheChoice of Public Employment
There are n citizens and three goods; a private good x, a discrete public good
g e{0,1} and labour £.Theprivate good is the numeraire and the wage rate is
denoted w.Thereare rn private firms producing the private good using labour
with the technology x =f()where f is smooth, increasing and strictly concave.
There is a single public firm which has the ability to produce the public good.
The public good can be produced with a variety of combinations of labour and
the private good. Let h(s) denote the required amount of private good to produce
the public good when £ units of labour are employed. It is assumed that h is
smooth, non-increasing and convex.
The citizens are either "workers" or "capitalists". The nw workers are endowed
with a single unit of labour which they supply inelastically, while the riG capitalists
each own a fraction 1/ne of each of the m firms. Every citizen has preferences over
his private good consumption and the public good given by the utility function
u(x.g)=x+v.g.
Private firms decide how much labour to hire and output to produce. Given
the wage rate i,eachfirm will demand an amount of labour £d(w)where
ed(W)= argmax{f()—
andearn profits 7r(w).Thegovernment chooses whether to produce the public
good and how the public firm should produce it. If the public firm employs £
workers, the government has a revenue requirement+h(c). The govern-
ment raises revenue via a proportional income tax at rate t and faces the budget
constraint G+h() =t[nw .i +Tn 71(w)].
16If the government provides the public good (g =1)and employs eGpublic
sector workers, the equilibrium wage will be given by *(ec)wherem.ed(w*(eG)) + =nw.It is clear that higher public sector employment increases thewage rate
and redistributes wealth from capitalists to workers. The tax ratenecessary to
balance the budget is given by
t(ec) =[w*(e)£c + h&G)}/[nw w() + m
If the government does not provide the public good, the equilibriumwage will be
w*(O) and taxes will be zero. Given the government's decisions (g, £),itfollows
that each worker's utility level can be written as
VW(9,eG) =g{(1
—t(ec))w*(ec)+ v} + (1 —
whileeach capitalist's utility level can be written as
VC(9,eG) =g[(l
—t(tG))mlr(w*(ec))/nc+ v](1 —g)[m7r(w*(O))/ncJ.
Suppose that the status quo involves the public good not being provided and
consider a policy change whereby the public good is provided and £-areemployed
in its production. This policy change necessitates imposing a tax rate of t().
Under what conditions is it efficient?
To restrict the cases that need to be considered. assume that capitalists enjoy
a higher income after the policy change than do the workers; that is, w*() <
7r(w*(e/G))/nc . Thisassumption implies that workers pay less than 1/nth of the
cost of providing the public good. Since the policy change raises the wage rate
and both workers and capitalists have the same valuation of the public good, it
follows that the workers' utility change exceeds that of capitalists. Accordingly,
if the policy change makes workers worse off, it must also make capitalists worse
off.
Suppose then that the policy change makes workers better off. It will be useful
to define three different levels of public employment. First, let £ be the level of
public employment which maximizes aggregate consumption of the private good.
Since the latter is the difference between total production of the private good and
the amount used in the production of the public good, it is the case that
=argmax{mf([nw
—£GI/m)
—
Thus,£ satisfies the first order condition that the marginal product of labour
in production of the private good equals the marginal reduction in private good
17needed to produce the public good when public employment is increased; that is,
f'([nv£c}/m) =—h'(c).
Second, let Gbethe level of public employment which maximizes the net of
tax income of the workers; that is,
=argmax{(1
—t(G))w*(G)}.
Itis straightforward to show that this level of public employment must exceed
that which maximizes aggregate consumption of the private good.'7 This reflects
the fact that higher levels of public employment raise the workers'wage.
Finally, let £Gbethe level of public employment which maximizes the net of
tax income of the capitalists; that is,
=argmax{(l
—t(G))7r(w*(G))}. L
Similarly, this level of public employment must be smaller than that which maxi-
mizes aggregate consumption of the private good. At levels of public employment
higher than £, lowering public employment both lowers the tax rate and boosts
firms' profits through its effect on the wage.
The policy change is efficient if and only if two conditions are satisfied. First,
it must make workers better off. As pointed out above, if this is not the case,
it must make all citizens worse off and can therefore be dominated by the null
policy change. Second, it must be the case that £-[,£c.If£ <cthen all
citizens can be made better off by increasing public employment to G" while if
> 4?cthen all citizens can be made better off by reducing public employment
to £G.Varyingthe public employment level between Gand£G moves the utility
allocation along the utility possibility frontier with higher public employment
levels generating higher utility levels for workers.
While varying the public employment level permits the government to redis-
tribute between the two groups, it is a costly way to redistribute. Choosing any
level other than £ reduces the amount of the private good available for consump-
tion. Thus, if the government has available other policy instruments which allow
it to shift resources between workers and capitalists at lower cost, then using
public employment will be inefficient.
Suppose, for example, that the government can impose a wage subsidy or tax.
Since workers supply their labor inelastically, this policy instrument permits the
'TSpecifically, it can be shown that (1 —t(eG))w*(ea) isincreasing on the interval [0, }.
18costless shifting of resources between workers and capitalists. Awage subsidy
financed by the income tax will shift resources from capitalists to workers, while
a wage tax with the proceeds used to reduce the income tax will shift resources
in the other direction. In this case, under the assumption that capitalists enjoy
a higher income after the policy change than do workers, the policy change is
efficient if and only if (i) the proposed public employment level is such as to
maximize aggregate consumption of the private good conditional on producing
the public good; i.e., I-= £and (ii) the aggregate value of the public good n v
exceeds its cost in terms of reduced consumption of the private good.
This example relates to the discussion of production efficiency in the optimal
taxation literature. Production efficiency arises when there is no rearrangement
of inputs which can generate strictly more of one consumption good, holding
constant the levels of all others. In this example, when the public good is being
provided, production efficiency occurs when I?G= £. Theissue is then whether
a policy change implying a departure from production efficiency is necessarily
inefficient. The analysis demonstrates that it all depends on the government's
ability to redistribute from capitalists to workers. This echoes the conclusions of
the optimal taxation literature. In the extended Diamond-Mirrlees model in which
private firms have decreasing returns to scale, Pareto efficient policy choices imply
production efficiency when the government can tax the profits of different firms at
different rates (Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972) and Mirrlees (1972)). However, this
implication is broken when the government does not have access to such taxes.
4. Objections to the Efficiency Approach
This section discusses three possible objections to the efficiency approach. The
first is that it is much more difficult to implement than either the social welfare
function or compensation criteria approaches. To check whether a policy change is
socially desirable using the social welfare function approach the analyst need only
understand the distributional consequences of the change. Using the compensa-
tion criteria approach also requires the analyst to investigate the utility allocations
that might be achieved through compensation from either the status quo or the
post-policy change situation. The efficiency approach requires more information
still. The analyst has to investigate how the distributional consequences of the
change might be achieved via other feasible policies. In principle, this requires
considering variations in a multitude of spending and taxation programs and even
considering the possibility of programs that are not currently in existence.
19In practice, it is not going to be possible for the analyst to check into all possi-
ble alternative policy changes. Realistically, in most circumstances, the compar-
ison of alternative changes is going to have to be limited to (i) those generated
by varying the parameters of the proposed policy change (as in the price con-
trol and public employment examples) and (ii) those generated by redistribution
through the tax-transfer system or other types of compensation schemes. With
these restrictions, the efficiency approach is not that much more involved than
the compensation criteria approach. The (implicit) assumptions made in cost
benefit analysis to implement the Kaldor criterion are that the government can
redistribute lump sum and that such redistribution from the status quo will not
significantly alter prices. The Kaldor criterion can then be checked by analyzing
the sum of compensating variations associated with the policy change. Under the
same assumptions, the policy change in question will be inefficient if it generates
a negative sum of equivalent variations or if there exists an alternative setting of
the parameters of the proposal that yields a higher sum of equivalent variations.
The only differences are (i) that equivalent variations are used rather than com-
pensating variations and (ii) that policy changes satisfying these conditions are
seen as efficient ways to achieve the distributional changes they produce, rather
than as necessarily socially desirable.
The second objection concerns the difficulty of decentralizing policy decisions
under the efficiency approach. One attraction of the social welfare function ap-
proach is that it is possible to define a set of shadow prices and instruct govern-
ment agencies to implement any project making positive profits at those prices
(see Dreze and Stern (1987) for the details). It is not obvious that this is possible
under the efficiency approach, since implementing it requires more than local in-
formation about feasible policies and their consequences. An interesting problem
for further research would be to investigate whether the efficiency approach might
be approximately decentralized via a system of shadow prices which convey the
cost of redistributing between different types of citizens.
The final objection concerns political feasibility. The efficiency approach de-
clares policy changes which can be Pareto dominated by alternative changes the
government could choose, to be socially undesirable. However, there is no guar-
antee that these alternative changes are politically feasible, in the sense that the
political process would choose to implement them. Thus. it might be that the
Pareto dominated policy change is the only politically feasible way of achieving
the distributional changes that it produces. Is it then reasonable to label it socially
undesirable?
20One response to this question is to dismiss the hypothetical scenario as a
serious possibility. Thus, one might argue that if politicians are interested in im-
plementing the distributional changes produced by the policy change in question,
they would certainly prefer a more efficient way of doing this. Accordingly, it
would never be the case that the policy change was politically feasible, but the
Pareto dominating changes were not. This line of defense is consistent with the
efficient redistribution hypothesis familiar from the public choice literature, which
asserts that political competition will ensure the selection of policies which are ef-
ficient in the sense that there are no alternative feasible policies which can achieve
the same distributional gains at lower cost (see, for example, Stigler (1971) and
Becker (1976)).18
Onthe other hand, if one treats the hypothetical scenario as a serious possi-
bility, the question must be answered. The issue boils down to whether political
feasibility should be taken into account by the approach; that is, should a policy
change be declared inefficient only if there exists an alternative politically feasible
policy change which Pareto dominates it?'9 It is hard to argue against taking
into account political feasibility if certain policy changes are really known to be
political non-starters. In such circumstances, it seems no more sensible to reject
policy changes because they are dominated by such alternatives than to do so
because they are dominated by alternatives that are technologically infeasible.
However, political feasibility is a more slippery concept than technological fea-
sibility. In particular, the political feasibility of a particular policy change may
be endogenous to the analyst's efforts to persuade politicians about its merits.
are a number of positive theories of policy choice which support this hypothesis,
Besley and Coate (1997) and Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) being two examples. That
said, there are also theoretical models which justify the opposite conclusion. For example, Coate
and Morris (1995) show that politicians concerned about their reputations may select sneaky
and inefficient methods of redistribution over more efficient transparent methods. Bullock (1995)
offers an empirical test of the hypothesis in the context of U.S. farm programs.
'9This dilemma is a familiar one to students of cost-benefit analysis. When comparing two
mutually exclusive projects, standard cost-benefit practice is to deem socially desirable the
project with the largest net benefit. However, many commentators have argued that the political
feasibility of the competing projects should be taken into account at this stage (see, for example,
Wildavsky (1966)). If the project with the largest net benefits is not likely to be selected by
the political process, then these critics argue that the project with smaller (but positive) net
benefits should be declared socially desirable. This scenario is a serious possibility because the
net benefit criteria does not take into account the distribution of benefits and costs. Since the
distributional implications of a policy tend to be a key determinant of its political fate, there is
no reason to believe that the project with larger net benefits will be more likely to be selected.
21Thus, to take political feasibility as a given is to deny the potential importance
of the analysis in determining policy outcomes. Accordingly, the answer should
depend on how "politically infeasible" an alternative actually is, which must be
determined on a case by case basis.
5. Conclusion
The efficiency approach provides an alternative foundation for the theory of policy
evaluation. It directs the policy analyst to investigate other ways of achieving the
distributional changes a policy change produces, rather than to analyze whether
such changes are socially desirable. This alternative focus is consonant with the
trend in normative public economics to characterize Pareto efficient policies rather
than those maximizing a particular social welfare function. It reflects the view
that the proper role of economic analysis should be to simply inform policy-makers
whether or not a policy change is an efficient way to achieve the distributional
changes that it produces, rather than pronouncing on the merits of such changes.
Evaluating policy changes using the efficiency approach is significantly more
involved than under standard procedures. The approach requires the policy ana-
lyst to form an assessment of the possibilities of affecting redistribution through
other means. Since such redistributive possibilities will depend on the specifics of
the situation, no general rules concerning the efficiency of particular types of pol-
icy changes are likely to be available. However, understanding what constitutes
efficient redistribution in broader policy environments than have been considered
to date will likely prove helpful in making the approach implement able.
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